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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
SAMUEL T. LAWTON, JR.*
Last year's Seventh Circuit Review' noted that the proliferation of
federal enactments in the environmental field generated an increasing number
of cases implementing and interpreting them. While the Seventh Circuit's
contribution has not been great numerically, it has been called upon to resolve
several highly complex and important matters in the environmental field.
During the past year, the court has rendered decisions interpreting various
provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,2
The Clean Air Act,3 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.4 In
addition, the court has rendered one decision premised on the common law of
nuisance, the traditional legal remedy for abating environmental damage.
Two cases considered substantive environmental control statutes. In
American Meat Institute v. EPA,5 the court was concerned with the EPA
administrator's capability of promulgating effluent standards under section
301 of the Water Act, 6 as distinguished from the determination of effluent
standards in implementation of his permit issuing jurisdiction on a case by
case basis. The court's decision in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA7 related to
the propriety of the administrator's designation of an air quality maintenance
area in Indiana, under the Clean Air Act. The principle issue revolved around
the question of ripeness of the proceeding.
Two cases involved NEPA. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Associa-
tion v. Lynn8 considered whether the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) had discharged its NEPA obligations re-
specting the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) in the
designation of housing sites pursuant to court order under Gautreaux v.
* Counsel, Altheimer & Gray; Adjunct Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School;
member, Illinois Pollution Control Board, 1970-73, acting Chairman, 1972-73; member of Illinois
Bar; LL.B., Harvard Law School.
I. Zabel, Environmental Law, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 326 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Zabel].
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1972).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1859 (1970&Supp. 1972).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as NEPA].
5. 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. 1972).
7. 536 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1976).
8. 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
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Chicago Housing Authority.9 The second, Swain v. Brinegar,10 was con-
cerned with whether the Secretary of Transportation, in planning and de-
veloping a forty-two-mile highway segment connecting Peoria and Lincoln,
Illinois, had fulfilled his obligations under the Federal-Aid Highway Act"
and under NEPA. This case was a reconsideration of an earlier decision
12
holding that the delegation of preparation of the EIS by the Federal Highway
Administration to the State of Illinois was not a fulfillment of NEPA
requirements. The case was reheard en banc because of amendments to NEPA
respecting delegation of preparation of the impact statement to a state
agency. 13 The earlier case had determined that the corridor selection was valid
but that the delegation of preparation of the EIS to the State of Illinois violated
NEPA.
Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co. 14 raised the recurring issue of
whether industrial enterprise which imposes burdens on a residential com-
munity may be subject to judicial restraint notwithstanding compliance with
relevant environmental and land use regulations. The case illustrated the
difficulties of environmental control under traditional common law nuisance
approaches.
EPA GUIDELINES UNDER THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
American Meat Institute required the making of two independent but
related determinations under the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.15 First, the court was obliged to determine whether it had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal based upon a determination of whether the EPA adminis-
trator's issuance of effluent limitations under section 301 was authorized.
16
Secondly, it was required to ascertain whether the regulations promulgated
comported with statutory and judicial standards set forth in the Act and
relevant judicial decisions.
Section 101(a) of the Act provides as a national goal, the elimination of
all discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985 and the achieve-
ment by 1983 "wherever attainable of a water quality adequate to maintain
9. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (original findings); 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(injunction requiring affirmative action), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
922 (1971); Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux,
96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
10. 542 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
11, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-155 (1970).
12. 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975). For a detailed discussion of the first decision, see Zabel,
note I supra, at 327-32.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970), as amended byAct of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, §
(D), 89 Stat. 424.
14. 528 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1975).
15. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter referred to ir the text as the Act].
16. Id. § 1311.
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aquatic life and allow recreational use. "17 As intermediate steps to achieve-
ment of the 1985 goal, section 301(b) 18 requires application of the "best
practicable control technology currently available" by July 1, 1977 to
achieve the promulgated effluent limitations on point sources. 19 Achievement
of the 1983 effluent limitations using the best available technology is also
determined in accordance with regulations issued by the administrator pur-
suant to section 304(b) of the Act.20
Section 304(b) further provides that the administrator shall publish
regulations providing "guidelines for effluent limitations" by identifying
specific pollutants and the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the
application of the 1977 and 1983 technologies. While sections 301 and 304
govern existing sources, provision has also been made requiring the adminis-
trator to promulgate regulations for new sources. 21 Section 40222 establishes a
permit system for discharges, replacing the permit system formerly adminis-
tered by the Army Corps of Engineers under the Act of 1899 .23
In American Meat Institute, the EPA administrator issued regulations
relating to the "Red Meat Processing Segment of the Meat Products Point
Source Category" covering simple and complex slaughterhouses. He also
promulgated regulations covering low and high processing packinghouses.
The regulations limited discharges of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD 5),
total suspended solids (TSS) and ammonia. They were correlated to the 1977
and 1983 achievement objectives. Plaintiffs, as operators of slaughterhouses
and meatpacking plants, sought review of the effluent limitations.
17. Id. § 1251(a).
18. Id. § 1311(b).
19. For a definition of a point source, see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. 1972): "The term
'point source' means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged."
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. 1972). See 526 F.2d at 445 n.5:
Although § 304(b) called for publication of final guideline regulations within one
year after the effective date of the Act, which would have been October 18, 1973, EPA
failed to do so, presumably because of the staggering proportions of its task. In an
action to require EPA to comply with the statutory deadline, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia ordered the agency to issue regulations for the Meat
Products Point Source Category by February 16, 1974. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 6 ERC 1033 (D.D.C. 1973). The court of appeals reversed the
district court's holding that the October 18 deadline applied to categories of point
sources, which unlike the meat product category, were not listed in § 306(b)(l)(A), 510
F.2d 692, 704 et seq. (D.C. Cir. 1975), but affirmed as to those categories that were so
listed.
Projected 1977 and 1983 technologies are to be defined by the administrator under section 304.
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1) (Supp. 1972).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. 1972).
22. Id. § 1342.
23. Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §407 (Supp.
1972)).
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Jurisdiction to Review
The issue respecting the court's jurisdiction was based on a challenge by
amici curiae24 that the administrator lacked authority under section 301 of the
Act to promulgate effluent standards. They argued his authority was limited
to the issuance of guidelines under section 304 which were reviewable only by
a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. 25 While section
509(b)(1) expressly provided for court of appeals review of effluent limitation
standards approved or promulgated under section 301, the amici argued that
the administrator lacked authority to issue effluent limits under section 301.
Accordingly, the regulations so issued were at most section 304 guidelines
not subject to court of appeal review. The court recognized that although the
parties to the litigation had not challenged the authority of the administrator to
establish section 301 regulations, since the court's jurisdiction was being
challenged, it would consider the argument made by amici curiae.
Two other courts of appeals had arrived at opposite conclusions on the
same issue. The Eighth Circuit in CPC International, Inc. v. Train26
supported the position of the amici holding that the administrator lacked
power to promulgate effluent regulations under section 301. Since the
regulations were not properly issued, they were not reviewable under section
509(b). The Third Circuit reached an opposite result in American Iron & Steel
Institute v. EPA, 27 finding the authority to issue section 301 effluent regula-
tions properly vested in the administrator. Several district courts had arrived
at a similar conclusion. 28
The Seventh Circuit first considered the administrator's determination
that he had jurisdiction under section 301 to set general limits based on section
304(b) guidelines and was not limited to establishment of effluent limits by
the permit issuing process alone on a case by case basis under section 402 of
the Act. Its initial consideration was the degree of deference to be accorded
the administrator's determination based on Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. 29 In Train, where differing interpretations of the same
provisions of the Act had been made by several courts of appeals, all differing
from the one adopted by the Agency, the United States Supreme Court held
that while the Agency's construction was not the only one it permissibly could
24. The amici who filed briefs attacking the administrator's authority were CPC Interna-
tional and the American Petroleum Institute. 526 F.2d at 448 n. 12.
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1970).
26. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
27. 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975).
28. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244, 1253 (W.D. Va. 1974),
aff'd, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1662 (1976); American Paper Inst. v.
Train, 381 F. Supp. 553, 554 (D.D.C. 1973); American Petroleum Inst. v. Train, No. 74-F-8, slip
op. at 6 (D. Colo. April 8, 1975).
29. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
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have adopted, it was at the very least sufficiently reasonable that it should
have been accepted by the reviewing court. More importantly, the Court
found it sufficiently reasonable to preclude the courts of appeals from
substituting their own judgment for that of the Agency. In the context of the
present case, the issue was not whether the Agency's interpretation of section
301 was the only one permissible, but whether it was sufficiently reasonable
to preclude the court from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency.
Secondly, the court of appeals considered provisions of section 509(b)
respecting jurisdiction of the court of appeals to review the administrator's
action in approving or promulgating effluent limits under section 301. While
section 301 did not expressly direct the administrator to adopt effluent limits,
subsection (a) provides that "except as in compliance with this section" the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful. Subsection (b)
requires achievement of certain "effluent limits for classes and categories of
point sources" by 1977 and 1983 respectively, the language of which is
difficult to reconcile with the view that effluent standards are to be set by
permit alone on an individual basis under section 304. Subsection (e) refers to
effluent limits established pursuant to "this section." Section 304 provides
that the guidelines to be published by the administrator shall be for the
purpose of adopting or revising effluent limits suggesting a power in the
administrator to promulgate across the board effluent limits independent of
the guidelines and independent of case by case allowance pursuant to permit
issuing authority.
The language of several other sections was likewise considered. Section
302(a) relates to the establishment of stricter effluent limits "than those set
under 301(b)(2)." Section 303 requires each state to identify waters where
effluent limits set under section 301 (b)(1) are not strong enough to implement
water quality standards and section 309 prohibits violations of section 301 or
the conditions of any permit issued under section 402. While not specifying
how or by whom the effluent limits are to be established, the court viewed the
foregoing provisions as support for the position that Congress intended
section 301(b) limits to have independent existence apart from the permit
process. 30
The court next considered the permit process itself. It noted that section
40 13' required state certification that the applicant complied with section 301
or that there was no applicable effluent limit under sections 301(b) or 302.
Section 505(f)3 2 defines effluent standards for purposes of citizens' suits to
include an effluent limit under section 301 of the Act and "a permit or
30. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1035-42 (3d Cir. 1975).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (Supp. 1972).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f) (Supp. 1972).
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condition thereof," negating a construction that such provisions relate exclu-
sively to permit conditions and supporting the contention that section 301(b)
contemplates effluent limit promulgation on its own and independent of
section 402 permit conditions.
The legislative history of the Act indicated that when the original version
was reported Senator Bentsen expressly stated that section 301(b)(1) antici-
pated that "the Administrator shall issue [regulations] pursuant to section 301
and section 304" of the Act. 33 The Senate report further expressly stated that
pursuant to sections 301(b)(1)(A) and 304(b) the administrator is to interpret
"best practicable" as a "basis for specifying" clear and precise effluent
limitations. Senator Muskie, during Senate consideration, observed that each
polluter would be obliged to achieve "nationally uniform effluent limitations
based on 'best practicable' technology no later than July 1, 1977' 34 and that
practicability and availability would not be determined on a plant by plant
basis. 35
The totality of the foregoing was held to establish the reasonableness of
the administrator's position and that it represented a reasonable accommoda-
tion of the policies embodied in the Act. Nationwide effluent standards would
assure uniformity with the state maintaining a major role in regulating water
pollution under section 101(b) of the Act. The EPA's position gave weight to
both the policy of uniformity and that of federalism. It avoided anomalies
inherent in the Eighth Circuit's CPC International decision. Under that
decision, individual EPA permits based on nationally uniform guidelines
would be directly reviewed by the court of appeals. 36 Yet the nationwide
guidelines themselves would be reviewed in the first instance by the district
court under the Administrative Procedure Act. Such a procedure would be
antithetical to the congressional purpose of using direct review to the courts of
appeals to insure expeditious and consistent application of effluent
guidelines. The court concluded that the position chosen by the EPA "was
'correct' to the extent that it can be said with complete assurance that any
particular interpretation of a complex statute [is a] 'correct' one." 37
Validity of the Promulgated Regulations
The court was therefore able to review the regulations promulgated. It
first enunciated the standards of review as follows:
33. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972,93
Cong., Ist Sess. 1283 (1973).
34. Id. at 162.
35. See American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442,451 n. 18 (7th Cir. 1975): "Remarks by
Senator Muskie, made in a similar context before passage of the Clean Air Act, have been held to
be 'entitled to significant weight.' " See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 734 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (Supp. 1972).
37. 526 F.2d at 452 (quoting Train v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S.
60, 87 (1975)).
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Under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . agency
action in an informal rulemaking proceeding is to be sustained
unless "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law." . . . This standard requires us to
determine whether "the decision was based on a consideration of
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment."38
The court held its role was not to set effluent limits itself or to substitute
its judgment for that of the Agency. 39 In substance, it was required to
determine whether the limitations set by the Agency were "the result of
reasoned decisionmaking. "' If the basis stated by the Agency for its decision
was insufficient, the court was not empowered to supply another reason
which the Agency itself has not chosen to rely on. It must "uphold a decision
of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.' 4
Based upon the foregoing standards of review, the court upheld all
effluent standards promulgated with the exception of the 1977 and 1983 TSS
standards for complex slaughterhouses and the 1983 ammonia limits. 42 The
1977 TSS standards for complex slaughterhouses were determined not
supported by a reasoned basis for the limitation, primarily because of the
EPA's failure to explain why, in this one instance, it rejected questionnaire
data and relied on inconsistent data from its own research testing agency.
Such reliance was contrary to previous procedures where questionnaire and
test data varied. While a departure from a previously taken position was
within the Agency's discretion, a reasoned and record-supported explanation
was necessary as to why the contrary approach was taken in this instance.
Questionnaires had been relied on previously when at odds with the test
results on the grounds that the questionnaire data collected over extended
periods was more reliable than isolated tests conducted by the research
institute employed by the EPA. Since the 1983 TSS complex slaughterhouse
regulations were, in part, based on the 1977 limits, the court believed that
these, too, should be reconsidered on remand.
1983 ammonia limits were found unacceptable because of the EPA's
sole reliance in arriving at the standard upon ammonia stripping which did not
appear to have technological support. The feasibility of the ammonia removal
system had not been established in the absence of supporting technology to
38. 526 F.2d at 452 (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973) & Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
39. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
40. 526 F.2d at 453 (quoting Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427,434 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974)).
41. 526 F.2d at 453 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
U.S. 281, 286 (1974)).
42. The rejected standards were remanded to the EPA for "expeditious consideration."
526 F.2d at 467.
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resolve problems of air flow, temperature, and scaling inherent in the
technique. Likewise, alternative methods of nitrification did not contain
record-support that the regulatory limits could be achieved.
Realizing that the 1977 deadline was fast approaching, the Seventh
Circuit made an effort to minimize the delay inherent in its remand order. The
court directed that the EPA may reissue the limitations without further
hearings, notice or opportunity for comment if it concluded on reconsidera-
tion that evidence in the existing record was adequate to support the
limitations even though it had not previously relied on them. Any renewed
challenge must then be filed within twenty-one days after the regulations were
repromulgated and would be heard by the court on an accelerated briefing
schedule.
The decision in American Meat Institute decisively shifted the judicial
balance in favor of EPA's interpretation of its authority under sections 301
and 304, and thereby promoted the achievement of national uniformity
among discharge limitations within particular point source categories. As the
court noted, the EPA could, by drafting its section 304 guidelines and vetoing
permits which did not comply, theoretically accomplish the same result in
terms of national uniformity even if it were held to have no power to
promulgate single number effluent limitations under section 301. Such an
alternative is largely illusory because it would involve the Agency in
innumerable detailed individual permit evaluations. Such guideline deci-
sions, reviewable in the federal district courts, rather than in the courts of
appeals, would produce divergent judicial rulings taking years to reconcile.
The EPA's view, as approved by the Seventh Circuit, will result in less
complicated permit evaluations. It also means that review will lie directly in
the courts of appeals. It assures a greater chance for uniformity and swift
reconciliation of any judicial disagreements which may arise. As the Seventh
Circuit noted, any other result "conflict[s] with the congressional purpose of
using direct review in the courts of appeals to insure expeditious and
consistent application of effluent guidelines."
43
RIPENESS FOR CHALLENGE OF EPA EMISSION STANDARDS
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The other case considered under a substantive environmental control
statute was Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA.' The petitioners, several steel
and power companies and a municipality, challenged the EPA's designation
under the Clean Air Act45 of certain areas in Indiana as air quality mainte-
43. Id. at 452.
44. 536 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1976).
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1859 (1970&Supp. 1972).
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nance areas (AQMA). The petition was dismissed on the grounds that the
challenged agency action was not ripe for review.
The Clean Air Act requires that state plans in implementation of national
primary and secondary air quality standards adopt emission limitations and
"such other measures necessary to assure attainment of primary and second-
ary national ambient air quality standards including land use and transporta-
tion controls.' 6 The EPA is given power to promulgate its own implementa-
tion plan where the state has failed to submit a plan to the EPA or where a plan
submitted does not accord with statutory requirements. In NaturalResources
Defense Council v. EPA,47 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit ordered review of the adequacy of all state implementation plans to
ascertain whether such plans contained measures necessary for maintenance
of national standards. Subsequently, the EPA disapproved all state im-
plementation plans for failure to contain adequate regulations or procedures
for maintenance of national standards.
The EPA then published regulations setting forth requirements for states
to follow in developing air quality maintenance provisions in their implemen-
tation plans. The maintenance provisions included establishment of areas
where, due to current air quality or projected growth rates, the national
standard may be exceeded within the subsequent ten-year period and provided.
criteria and standards for the establishment of such areas. Since Indiana failed
to submit its own AQMA designations, pursuant to its statutory authority,48
the EPA issued its own for the state.
Petitioners challenged these designations on a variety of theories: (1)
that they were not promulgated in compliance with procedural safeguards
under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) that they were not authorized by
the Clean Air Act; and (3) that they constituted an unconstitutional exercise of
federal power. The EPA took the view that the designations should not be
reviewed before specific maintenance plans were formulated and until
plaintiffs would be subjected to sanctions for noncompliance.
Section 307(b)( 1),4 which vests review of plans promulgated by the
administrator in the court of appeals, was deemed to provide a forum for such
review. However, the section was not dispositive of when such a proceeding
should take place. Nor did it require the court of appeals to take jurisdiction
independent of considerations of ripeness. Support for the court's position
was found in other circuits. 5° Turning to the ripeness issue, the court relied
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (Supp. 1972).
47. 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (Supp. 1972); 40 C.F.R. § 52.792 (1976) (designation).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (Supp. 1972).
50. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, No. 75-1463 (10th Cir. March 18, 1976); Buckeye
Power, Inc. v. EPA, 525 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1975).
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primarily on the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner l which had stated: "The problem [determination of
ripeness] is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." 52
The court considered the application of the foregoing standard to the
facts of the instant case. The first determination was whether the issues raised
by plaintiffs respecting the authority of the administrator to issue the chal-
lenged regulations were sufficiently concrete "to prevent the courts..
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over administrative
policies." 3 The court found the issues raised were either "purely legal" or
concerned completed matters which would not be clarified if review were
delayed because no further factual developments could occur. In this respect,
the issues were deemed sufficiently concrete for review.
The next consideration was whether the challenged agency action was
"final." The challenged regulation was considered "definitive" by Abbott
standards. However, unlike the regulation under consideration in Abbott, no
compliance by plaintiffs was expected since the promulgated regulations only
provide for a study by Indiana of future air pollution in the designated areas.
Standards for a plaintiff to follow could not be promulgated until completion
of the study. The agency's action was, therefore, not final but rather part of an
ongoing and continuing administrative decisionmaking process. While the
issues presented concrete legal questions, they were not fit for judicial
review, not having reached the point where they required compliance by
plaintiff.
The absence of a final agency decision militating against review,
however, had to be weighed against the hardship to plaintiffs in denying
review. The current EPA listing of areas for further study by the states did not
impose obligations on plaintiffs and the possibility of further injury in
complying with future standards set by the state was not sufficient to warrant
review of the designation at the present time. The steel and power companies
contended that AQMA designation of Porter County caused uncertainty in
business operation because capital must be maintained to cover possible
expenditures of funds for pollution control equipment required to meet more
restrictive air pollution regulations. With respect to the power companies, the
designation would affect economic growth in the companies' service areas
which had to be taken into account in the companies' current capital planning.
Furthermore, disclosure of the EPA's designation through Securities and
51. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
52. Id. at 148.
53. Id.
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Exchange Commission requirements would allegedly diminish the value of
the companies' securities and adversely affect their fund-raising capability.
The hardship contention of the city of Evansville was premised on the
designation of Vanderburgh County as an AQMA. Such a designation
allegedly forced the city into a dilemma. Funds allocated by the city for
environmental purposes were being used for local projects. With its AQMA
designation, the EPA had asked the city to participate in analysis and planning
of air quality management standards for the county, which in turn required
curtailment of the city's current environmental projects. The city contended
that its nonparticipation in such projects would result in a plan of inferior
quality.
Both contentions were rejected by the court. The court found the claims
of uncertainty advanced by the power and steel companies "vague and
speculative" and not involving injuries in the nature of concrete business
costs envisioned by the Supreme Court in Abbott and Toilet Goods Associa-
tion v. Gardner.54 In those cases, the plaintiffs were forced to expend
considerable funds for compliance or face serious penalties for noncom-
pliance and the stigma inherent in violating the law. No such dilemma existed
in the present case since there was no directive to comply with and no
sanctions for noncompliance. Further, the Agency action was not deemed to
affect primary conduct such as contract negotiation, ingredient testing or
record compilation. The only effect was on long-range planning. The
challenged actions would be reviewable in the future when the AQMA was
incorporated in the state implementation plans. At that time, plaintiffs'
hardship would preclude denial of review on grounds of ripeness because they
then would face the dilemma of expending funds to meet anti-pollution
standards or face penalties and loss of good will for noncompliance, the
classic dilemma found in pre-enforcement review cases.
The claim of the city of Evansville was considered on a different footing
since it was unquestionably faced with a "difficult and immediate" choice as
to allocation of funds earmarked for environmental purposes. However, the
dilemma faced by Evansville was not of the type which would compel
immediate review since the city's dilemma was one faced by all governmental
bodies confronted with the need for expenditures greater than funds available.
No external sanctions would be imposed on the city if it chose not to
participate in the air quality study. The claimed loss would be of its own
making, not the EPA's, and the relief should be sought by appeal to "the
source of those funds, not to this court,"-5 5 a conclusion of questionable
realism. Further, the court considered speculative, at best, the city's assertion
54. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
55. 536 F.2d at 164.
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that its failure to participate in the air quality study would produce an inferior
product which it characterized pursuant to the decision in United States v.
SCRAP56 as an "ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable."
In sum, the court found the challenge to the administrative action not ripe
for review. While the actions were complete and final, they were part of an
ongoing administrative process not yet culminated in a coercive order
directed to the plaintiffs. No direct or immediate harm was alleged to result
from the interim order. In view of the strong national interest in furthering the
mandate of the Clean Air Act, judicial action which would delay "the already
prolonged program to develop and maintain an unpolluted environment" 57
was not warranted.
"PEOPLE POLLUTION" AND NEPA
In Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Association v. Lynn, 58 the court
considered an injunction proceeding filed by plaintiff, a corporation or-
ganized "to prevent the damage to neighborhood communities which will
result if low-rent housing for low-income families is placed in working-class
and middle-class neighborhoods of Chicago." 59 The proceeding sought to
enjoin the building of low income housing units by the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) with the assistance of the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on the grounds that HUD had failed
to comply with NEPA ° in failing to file an EIS. The district court's judgment
for the defendants was affirmed.
The court reviewed the history of efforts to locate public housing in the
Chicago metropolitan area culminating in the decision of the district court in
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority61 which ordered the CHA to
construct 1,500 units of low income scattered-site housing. As an initial step
toward compliance, HUD and CHA instituted an eighty-four-unit scattered-
site housing project of which sixty-three units were under construction at the
time of the litigation. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin this construction of public
housing on the grounds that HUD failed to file an EIS under section 102 of
NEPA assessing the impact of siting low income public housing in middle and
working-class neighborhoods.
56. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
57. 536 F.2d at 164.
58. 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
59. Id. at 227.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (1970).
61. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (original findings); 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
(injunction requiring affirmative action), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
922 (1971); Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'dsubnom. Gautreauxv.
Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96S.
Ct. 1538 (1976).
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Plaintiffs alleged that low income housing tenants as a group, when
compared to the social class represented by the individual plaintiffs, possess a
" 'higher propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physical violence,'
'a disregard for physical and aesthetic maintenance of real and personal
property,' and 'a lower commitment to hard work.' "62 Plaintiffs, in contrast
were alleged to belong to a social class that emphasized " 'obedience and
respect for lawful authority' " and to possess" 'a much lower propensity for
criminal behavior' and 'a high regard for physical and aesthetic improvement
of real and personal property.' "63 Plaintiffs contended that the proposed
construction of CHA scattered-site housing would have a direct adverse
impact upon the physical safety of those plaintiffs residing in close proximity
to the sites, as well as a direct adverse effect upon the aesthetic and economic
quality of their lives so as to "significantly affect the quality of the
environment. "
The court analyzed the substantive provisions of the statute requiring an
EIS for all major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment. The Council on Environmental Quality guidelines
promulgated in implementation of NEPA required federal agencies to estab-
lish their own procedures to identify those actions requiring environmental
impact statements. 64 Pursuant to these guidelines, HUD had issued its own
regulations for systematic evaluation of the department's programs. A special
environmental clearance for the first eighty-four sites proposed to comply
with the Gautreaux litigation had been conducted. A negative statement or
finding of inapplicability was issued stating that the proposed project posed
no significant environmental impacts.
The sufficiency of the HUD environmental review was challenged at the
trial. Plaintiffs' evidence consisted inter alia of statistics demonstrating the
welfare dependency of CHA tenants. It further showed their need for
employment opportunities and their dependence on day care, health care,
educational services and youth and family counseling. If unsatisfied, plain-
tiffs alleged these needs would lead to neighborhood problems, violence and
property destruction. Because HUD had failed to examine these considera-
tions, plaintiffs asserted that HUD had breached its duty under NEPA to
weigh the potential environmental traumas associated with the construction of
low-cost housing. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the district court doubted
"the utility of projecting human behavior on the basis of social statistics" and
concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove that the social characterizations of
the prospective CHA tenants would have a significant impact on the human
environment so as to require HUD to prepare an EIS.
62. 524 F.2d at 228.
63. Id.
64. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3(a) (1976).
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On appeal, the court of appeals first considered the standard of review of
an EIS. It held that the Agency's determination that an EIS need not be filed
should be sustained unless the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion or
otherwise was not in accordance with the law.65 The court observed that the
national policy expressed in NEPA is "as broad as the mind can conceive"
and necessarily included concern for the quality of urban life, observing
further, however, that environmental problems of the city "are not as readily
identifiable as clean air and clean water. "I This lent support to the view that
deference would be accorded the Agency's good faith judgment and the
"arbitrary and capricious" context for review of such administrative matters
would be controlling.
The court concluded that HUD was not compelled to consider the
comprehensive environmental impact of the entire 1,500 unit scattered-site
program as a single entity but could confine its environmental analysis to the
eighty-four units approved to date. Comprehensive evaluation required by the
statute did not compel HUD to aggregate the entire program if, in the
Agency's judgment, evaluation of the aggregate was not feasible. Since no
more than eighty-four of the 1,500 sites had been selected, comprehensive
evaluation of the total program was not only infeasible but impossible. The
entire concept of the scattered site program called for environmental evalua-
tion on a discrete site basis. Such sequential evaluation, as housing sites were
selected, was not an abuse of discretion.
The court next held, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, that the record was
adequate to support HUD's decision not to file an EIS. The record was
dependent on the "particular federal action proposed," and a concise no
significant impact statement may be sufficient if grounded on supporting
evidence. 67
The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that low income public
housing tenants as a group, statistically exhibited a high incidence of
violence, law violation and destruction of property and that HUD failed to
consider the adverse impact of these social characteristics on the neighbor-
hoods CHA had chosen for the construction of scattered-site housing.
However, the court concluded that "people pollution" of the environment
"cannot fairly be projected as having been within the contemplation of
Congress. '68
65. 524 F.2d at 229. See First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir.
1973).
66. 524 F.2d at 229 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d at 1377).
67. SeeHanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d640,646 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990(1973).
68. 524 F.2d at 231 (quoting Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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However, the court indicated there was no need to resolve the question in
the context of the present case as HUD had in fact considered the impact of the
scattered-site housing on the social fabric of the recipient communities.
HUD's negative statement relied on several factors to conclude the project
was not likely to produce adverse environmental effects. Among the factors
considered was the low density design of the housing. Since the housing
would be built on vacant lots in compliance with local zoning, anticipated
burdens on schools, transportation and community services would be at most
"incremental." Further, pursuant to the Gautreaux decree, one-half of all
dwelling units at a site would be offered to housing applicants residing in the
community. From the foregoing, the court concluded that there was little
reason to believe that the influx of new CHA tenants would drastically alter
the character of the neighborhood. Lastly, CHA tenant selection and eviction
policies would diminish the potential of danger to the well-being of their
neighbors.
Consideration had also been given in the HUD negative statement to
such physical environmental matters as solid waste disposal, sewage, water
pollution, noise levels and traffic congestion. Based on the fact that the
proposed housing was an "infill" of existing neighborhoods, the HUD
statement concluded that the project would have no significant environmental
impact. The totality of the foregoing was deemed a satisfactory basis for
judicial review of the Agency's decision. The court disposed of the plaintiff's
contention that the mere existence of a controversy mandates the preparation
of an EIS, holding that the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines
requiring an EIS when the environmental impact of the project was likely to
be highly controversial69 were not applicable in the context of the present
proceeding.
Finally, the court held that HUD satisfied the requirements of the Act in
using a systematic disciplinary approach and in exploring alternatives to
scattered-site housing required by sections 102(2)(A) and 102(2)(D) of
NEPA. 70 HUD's failure to consult particular sources favored by plaintiff was
not fatal since the court found that HUD, in good faith, had considered the
impact of the project on the social environment of the site neighborhoods.
With respect to the alleged failure to consider alternatives to the
scattered-site program, such as broad scale metropolitan planning and com-
prehensive social service programs to alleviate problems of low income
public housing tenants, the court observed that the scattered-site housing was
court-ordered and HUD and CHA had no alternative but to construct the
housing. The only alternatives available were in site selection and in this
69. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a) (1976).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(A), (D) (1970).
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respect, HUD and CHA had acted within the parameters of Gautreaux
suggesting rejection of two sites for noncompliance with noise control
guidelines pending further environmental analysis, indicating that the agen-
cies had exercised a degree of selectivity in site selection and that NEPA
requires no more. 71
SCOPE AND DELEGATION OF EIS REQUIREMENTS
Swain v. Brinegar72 had been before the court in the previous term73 and
was reconsidered en banc because of the congressional amendment to NEPA
bearing on the issues in the earlier decision. The basic issue in Swain was
whether the Illinois Department of Transportation in its corridor selection,
land acquisition and construction of a fifteen-mile segment of a forty-two-
mile supplemental freeway connecting Peoria and Lincoln, Illinois complied
with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 197014 and NEPA. Plaintiffs, as owners
of a 440-acre farm part of which was in the path of the new highway, sought to
enjoin further acquisitions and construction of the fifteen-mile segment
71. Five cases have considered the issues of whether people can be "pollution" as
distinguished from "polluters" and whether environmental impact under NEPA can be con-
strued to include a class of persons per se. See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d
421 (5th Cir. 1973); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal
Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 999
(1972); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp..877 (D. Ore. 1971).
In Hiram Clarke, the court held HUD's environmental assessment adequate in support of a
272-unit low and moderate income housing project in considering the environmental effect of
"deteriorating neighborhood influences." In Goose Hollow, the court found HUD's examination
inadequate to support a high-rise apartment building in a low-rise dwelling area. The court noted
that "the building will undoubtedly change the character of the neighborhood." However,
"neighborhood character" as used by the court related to population density and structural
nonconformity and not consequences of the character alleged by plaintiff in Nucleus. In
Maryland-National, the court considered that the project had to comply with zoning standards as
embodying aesthetic, cultural and social considerations affecting the locality.
The Hanly cases concerned the construction of a large federal jail facing two apartment
structures. The court directed the General Service Administration environmental review board to
consider the possible effects on the neighborhood of future prisoner riots, increased noise levels
and the effect of a proposed drug treatment center. These were a consequence of squeezing a jail
into a narrow area directly across from the two apartment houses. The second EIS produced was
found adequate with respect to environmental consequences of possible riots and noise. The EIS
was found deficient, however, for failure to consider whether crime might increase in the
neighborhood because of out-patient use of the drug treatment center attached to the jail.
Superficially, this concept seemed to lend support to plaintiffs' position in Nucleus that people,
including those not convicted of any offense, could per se constitute an environmental threat
under NEPA by their presence in the neighborhood. It lent support in spite of the difference in the
structure of the class in issue in each case and the difference in predictive capabilities respecting
the classes.
For a discussion of these issues, see Daffron, Using NEPA to Exclude the Poor, 4
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 81 (1975).
72. 542 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1976).
73. 517 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1975). For a detailed discussion of the first decision, see Zabel,
note I supra, at 327-32.
74. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-155.
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because of alleged violations of the foregoing statutory provisions. 75
The plaintiffs challenged the compliance with the Federal-Aid Highway
Act on the basis that the selection of the corridor was arbitrary and violated the
Act's full disclosure policy. The challenge to the adequacy of the EIS was
based on the allegation that preparation of the EIS was impermissibly
delegated by the Federal Highway Administration to a state agency and, in
any event, was insufficient under NEPA requirements. The district court had
held in favor of defendants. On the first appeal, the court of appeals validated
the corridor selection but held that there was improper delegation by the.
Federal Highway Administration to the Illinois Department of Transportation
with respect to preparation of the EIS.
After the earlier decision, Congress amended NEPA 76 to provide that an
EIS was not legally insufficient solely by reason of having been prepared by a
state agency or official if: (1) The state agency had state-wide jurisdiction; (2)
the federal official furnished guidance and participated in the preparation; (3)
the federal official independently evaluated the statement prior to approval
and adoption; and (4) the federal official notified and solicited the views of
other state or federal land management entities of any action or alternative that
may have significant impact on such entity. The amendment did not relieve
the federal official of his responsibility for the scope, objectivity and content
of the entire EIS.
To determine the effect of the amendment on the prior ruling, a rehearing
was granted en banc. At the outset, the court concluded that the earlier
decision could not stand in light of the NEPA amendment. The EIS as
prepared by the state agency was deemed to satisfy the procedural require-
ments of the amendment with respect to adequacy of federal review, federal
guidance to the state and federal participation. Further, the federal agency
pursuant to the amendment had accepted and exercised final authority for
evaluation of the environmental impact of the proposal.
The court next considered the sufficiency of EIS in terms of compliance
with the requirements of NEPA and whether the scope of EIS was as broad as
the scope of the federal action, giving consideration to the recently decided
case of Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Co. v. SCRAP. 7 7 The court found no
75. See Zabel, note 1 supra, at 327.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, §
D, 89 Stat. 424.
77. 422 U.S. 289 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SCRAPI1]. In SCRAPII, a "general revenue
proceeding" by the ICC approving across-the-board rate increases proposed by the railroad was
held by the Supreme Court to be "non-final" action by which the adequacies of an EIS could be
determined. Plaintiffs asserted that the Commission's EIS had given inadequate consideration to
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flaw in the EIS so far as it evaluated the fifteen-mile segment. However, since
in the view of the majority, the federal action involved concerned the entire
forty-two-mile freeway, an EIS addressed only to the fifteen-mile segment
was deemed insufficient.
The court spelled out the EIS requirements of section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA, itemizing the factors that must be included in the detailed statement
mandated by the act. While finding the EIS met statutory standards for the
fifteen-mile stretch in all particulars, the court could not agree that it was
proper to confine the EIS to the fifteen-mile segment alone. Basing its
decision on the NEPA statute, regulations and cases, the majority concluded
that the proposed federal action being taken included the funding of the entire
forty-two miles of the project. The district court judgment was accordingly
reversed.
Addressing itself first to the Federal Highway Administration policy and
procedure memorandum implementing Council on Environmental Quality
guidelines,78 the court observed that the memo expressly provided that:
"[p]iecemealing proposed highway improvements in separate environmental
statements should be avoided. If possible, the highway section should be of
substantial length that would normally be included in a multiyear highway
improvement program. '- 79
The court found the purpose of the foregoing standards to be to insure
that any assessment of environmental impact from the project was meaning-
ful. Segmentation would limit the usefulness of the studies. While each of the
small segments might be devoid of serious consequences standing alone,
when taken as a whole, they could have devastating consequences. Secondly,
preparation of an EIS for an initial segment would set the overall pattern for
the balance of the highway. This would make subsequent studies a formalistic
exercise because the capability of the decisionmaker to choose an alternative
route would no longer exist. Such a circumstance would frustrate the
objectives NEPA was designed to achieve. A balance must be struck by the
the environmental consequences of its rate determination in favoring virgin materials over
recyclables. They further asserted the increase would deter to a significant degree the environ-
mentally desirable use of recycled materials. In upholding the adequacies and scope of the EIS,
the Court held that the comprehensiveness of an EIS may be correlated to the character of the
proceeding requiring it. "In order to decide what kind of an environmental impact statement need
be prepared, it is necesssary first to describe accurately the 'federal action' being taken." Id. at
322. The more final and comprehensive the nature of the "action" by the agency, the more
comprehensive the EIS required. In the instant case, since the ICC decision was not final with
respect to particular rates and was "neutral" in that it was a percentage increase applicable to
both virgin and recyclable materials, the amount of environmental impact directed by NEPA was
considered correspondingly low, the scope of the EIS being trimmed to the breadth of the action
calling for it.
78. 23 C.F.R. § 771.5(a) (1976) (current language).
79. Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1976). See 23 C.F.R. § 771.5(a) (1976).
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decisionmaker and the courts between short term segmented and meaningless
studies and long term visionary exercises that may take years to accomplish.
"The view [taken] must be one neither confined by the literal limits of the
specific proposal nor one unbounded except by the limits of the designer's
imagination.' '8 The task of the court was not to make the choice but to
ascertain whether the choice made was reasonable.
With respect to the proposed highway projects the court relied upon
decisions previously considering the issue. 81 The court enunciated the follow-
ing standards to determine the scope of the proposed project:
(1) Does the proposed segment have a substantial utility independ-
ent of future expansion? (2) Would its construction foreclose
significant alternative routes or locations for an extension from the
segment? (3) If, as here, the proposed segment is part of a larger
plan, has that plan become concrete enough to make it highly
probable that the entire plan will be carried out in the near future ?82
Based upon the foregoing standards, the court concluded that the EIS
must cover the entire forty-two-mile freeway. First, the court found that the
proposed fifteen-mile stretch had no independent utility apart from the total
forty-two-mile project, observing that the northern terminus of the segment
ended at no logical or major terminus. In this respect, the court disagreed with
the district court finding that a completed three and one-half-mile stretch at
the northern terminus of a fifteen-mile stretch was a major highway control
element. The court concluded rather that the north and south ends of the
fifteen-mile stretch are merely points in the country. Secondly, building of the
fifteen-mile stretch would limit choices for constructing the northern seg-
ment, thus tainting any separate environmental evaluation of the northern
component. Lastly, the fifteen-mile segment was part of a firm forty-two-
mile supplemental freeway. Federal funding had been or would be sought for
the total project. Accordingly, the whole forty-two-mile segment was an
ongoing project which constituted the federal action being taken as required in
SCRAP 11. The entire project, therefore, constituted a single enterprise.
While the forty-two-mile project was part of a total 1,800 mile trunk system,
the total project was not subject at the outset to the requirements of NEPA,
since the larger project was considered in the "visionary" category and still
subject to revision.
In this respect, the court's view was consistent with that expressed in
Nucleus. In both cases it held that the federal action to which NEPA
80. 542 F.2d at 369.
81. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976); Daly
v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1975); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir.
1973); Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas State Highway
Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
82. 542 F.2d at 369.
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consideration must be addressed was not the total contemplated project
(1,500 homes - 1,800 miles) but the discrete viable elements thereof having
independent significance as part of the whole (84 homes - 42 miles), the
segments of which, however, could not be further broken down into separate
non-discrete components (15 miles - 1 home) for EIS purposes. The court
concluded that the total forty-two-mile project must be evaluated as a unit and
the existence of an EIS for the northern portion, even if coupled with the EIS
for the fifteen-mile stretch did not suffice. Judgment was reversed and the
case remanded.
Judge Swygert filed a separate concurring opinion which agreed with the
majority that construction of the forty-two-mile stretch was the proper federal
action to which the EIS should be addressed but disagreed with its assessment
that the Federal Highway Administration's delegation of preparation of the
EIS to Illinois authorities fulfilled the statutory requirements of the NEPA
amendments respecting the federal agency's duties for EIS preparation. In his
view, the federal authority had failed to furnish sufficient guidance and
participation in the EIS preparation and had done little more than rubber
stamp the state-prepared EIS. Comments and criticisms voiced by the federal
agency prior to preparation of the final EIS were brief and insignificant,
demonstrating a lack of serious independent analysis or review required by
the statute, placing ultimate control in federal hands. 83
Judge Tone, in an opinion concurred in by Judges Pell and Bauer,
dissented, believing the fifteen-mile segment a proper entity for the prepara-
tion of an EIS. Diagramming the entire forty-two-mile project, Judge Tone
noted the completion of the three and one-half-mile segment connecting the
fifteen-mile stretch in issue to the remaining twenty-three and one-half-mile
portion to the north terminating in Peoria. The existence of this three and
one-half-mile segment in Judge Tone's view gave the fifteen-mile stretch to
the south an independent and discrete significance precluding what in its
absence might allow for a possible alternative routing of the entire project.
The only way an alternative route could be pursued would be by abandoning
and duplicating the three and one-half-mile stretch already existing, a
possibility never suggested. The Federal Highway Administration's charac-
terization of the three and one-half-mile stretch, as a major highway control
element under its own regulations, should have been accorded due deference.
In Judge Tone's view, the court has articulated the principle that the role of the
court was to determine whether the agency has made a reasonable choice but
had not applied the principle to the facts of the case.
83. See Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Secretary of Transp., 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
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THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL POLLUTION REMEDIES
In Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co. ,84 the court was confronted
with competing environmental considerations in the context of a traditional
nuisance action. The case furnished a classic situation requiring balance, in
the court's language, between "the legitimate demands of an urban neighbor-
hood for clean air and a comfortable environment against the utility and
economic enterprise of a beneficial, but polluting, industry.' '85
The facts were relatively simple. Defendant, pursuant to zoning allow-
ance granted by the relevant governmental authorities and consistent with
restrictive covenants, established and operated an automobile shredding plant
in a predominantly industrial area of Indianapolis on land previously used as a
railroad roundhouse and later as a dumping ground. Plaintiffs were owners
and residents who lived or operated businesses in adjacent areas. They
contended that the operation of the shredder caused dust, vibration and noise
in amounts and kinds constituting statutory and common law nuisance by
damaging and endangering the health and safety of the residents and workers
in the area. The operation also allegedly violated municipal air pollution
regulations.86
Zoning allowance was given, on application to defendant's predecessor
in interest, by the City-County Council of Marion County. The zoning
application was accompanied by an extensive list of restrictive covenants
imposing restrictions on the operation relative to noise, burning, and waste
disposal. It also detailed the configuration of the installation, fencing, and
traffic access. The zoning classification placed the operation in a heavy
industrial district. The classification imposed height restrictions on buildings
and equipment and included environmental restrictions on noise, vibration,
smoke and odors.
The proposed land use and operation were abandoned by the original
applicant but were later taken over by the defendant, subject to the zoning
allowances and restrictive covenants. Permits for operation were issued by
the municipal authorities and operations ensued. Shortly thereafter, com-
84. 528 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1975).
85. Id. at 1109.
86. The character and operation of a shredder can best be discerned by the court's
description:
[A] shredding machine is composed of massive rotary teeth (called "hammers") that
rip off pieces of the automobile as it passes a cutting edge and then spits fist-sized
chunks of metal and other matter across a series of "cascades," blowers, and magnets,
which separate the ferrous metals from the non-ferrous metals and debris. A series of
conveyors then carries the product and waste to storage. A "hammermill" such as the
one in this case weighs 220 tons and measures approximately ten feet in width, fourteen
feet in length, and nine feet in height. The conveyors, blowers, cascades, motors, and
storage bins that clean, treat, and house the shredded product are built around this
central machine.
Id. at 1110.
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plaints respecting the shredders' noise, vibration and air pollution were
voiced by neighbors resulting in modifications and improvements in the
operation, including installation of additional air pollution control and noise
abatement equipment.
The instant suit was originally filed in an Indiana court and removed to
the federal court. The plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive
damages and a permanent injunction to shut down the operation. Plaintiffs'
subjective evidence respecting the discomfort and damage allegedly caused
by the shredder related to cracked walls, dust accumulation, sleepless nights,
disturbance of children and diminution of property values. Vibrations from
the shredder operation were alleged to have interfered with certain business
operations. Governmental officials and media representatives testified for the
plaintiffs. Their testimony corroborated the testimony of the neighborhood
witnesses regarding noise, vibration and air pollution. No plaintiff testimony
supported specific adverse health impacts from the shredder operation or
violations of environmental regulations or significant zoning infractions.
Recurring explosions from gas tanks going through the hammermill were
deemed by the court to "present little danger to the neighborhood" and
viewed as excusable because the "company gave the fire department its
complete cooperation on the matter." Testimony of local realtors respecting
loss of property values consequential to the shredders' operation was less than
the nonexpert estimates by the claimants.
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the court, summarized the plaintiffs'
testimony as "sincere but unsophisticated assessments of the harm the
shredder had caused" evidencing strong proof of the displeasure and an-
noyance caused by the shredder's noise, vibration and air pollution. How-
ever, the evidence "failed to show either actual health hazards or significant
damage to building structures" directly attributable to the shredder's
operation.
Defendant's testimony contrasted sharply with plaintiffs', both in form
and substance. It consisted principally of expert testimony that improvements
were made by the defendant to minimize environmental harm from air
pollution, noise explosions and vibration. They further testified to testing
done at the site and compliance with regulatory limits. Defendant's property
valuation experts contended that property damage was insignificant because
of the age of the buildings, ranging from fifty to one hundred years, the
antiquated condition of the property and the industrial character of the area.
Options considered by the trial judge were to allow continuation of the
business and award permanent damages or alternatively to enter an injunction
shutting down the business. The court's decision adopted both alternatives,
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awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages totalling $500,000
and entering a permanent injunction ordering the shredder to cease operations
within forty days.
While conceding that the plaintiffs were entitled to "some form of
equitable relief and damages," the court of appeals reversed and remanded,
holding the award of both injunctive relief and permanent and punitive
damages improper. Characterizing nuisance actions as a "legal garbage
can," the court recognized that concern for a cleaner environment has forced
the courts to fashion modern hybrids of the traditional concepts of nuisance
law and equity. The instant case represented a classic situation where the
desires of a community for economic and industrial strength must be balanced
against the need for clean and livable surroundings. The court noted this was a
task not easily achieved and one for which the courts may not be ideally
suited, notwithstanding their traditional role in balancing equities and their
insulation from pressures to which legislatures and administrative agencies
are often subjected. Limitations on such auto shredders presented difficulties
beyond those normally characterizing disputes of this nature because the
defendant, in addition to making an economic contribution to the community
in the form of payroll taxes and an investment, was also furnishing a needed
environmental benefit in providing a means of disposing of junk cars, a
continuing subject of blight, by presenting a means of recycling and ultimate
conservation of natural resources.
The court viewed its task as two-fold: first, it was required to determine
whether a nuisance existed and if so, what type; second, what form of relief
should be fashioned. In the court's view, a permanent injunction would be
warranted only where the nuisance imminently and dangerously affected the
public health or where non-health injuries were substantial. Absent the
foregoing circumstances, a permanent injunction would only be entered
where there was reckless disregard of substantial annoyances to adjacent
property owners plus an impossibility of mitigating the offensive characteris-
tics of the business.
Based upon the foregoing standards, the court found the entry of a
permanent injunction to be error. Recognizing some degree of adverse impact
on the adjacent areas, the court felt the health, safety, and welfare injury had
not been shown to justify the extreme remedy. No violations of environmental
or health regulations were in the record, showing a lack of support for the
district court's findings that zoning ordinances and vibration, noise and air
pollution standards had been violated so as to endanger the public health. On
this basis, a permanent injunction was held unwarranted.
Several factors particularly impressed the court and led to the ultimate
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determination. The first factor was the absence of evidence of violation of any
environmental regulation. From this the court reasoned, somewhat simplisti-
cally, that no adverse health consequences would ensue from defendant's
operation. Secondly, the court viewed the age of the residences and other
structures in the area, the general industrial character of the neighborhood and
the former uses of the subject property as factors precluding substantial
damage awards. Next, the court gave defendant considerable credit for the
amount of work done to alleviate the environmental impact resulting from the
operation. Lastly, the court observed defendant's compliance with zoning
standards and essentially all of the covenant restrictions.
In the last analysis, the court viewed the case in large measure as a
zoning problem to be resolved on the local level and was understandably
influenced by the fact that the property where the shredder was situated had
been classified for zoning purposes by the municipal government to accom-
modate the use. The court held that on the totality of all factors, particularly
the absence of adverse health effects, the defendant should have been given
time to alleviate the burdens caused. The remand would appear to enable the
district court to retain jurisdiction while defendant took the necessary correc-
tive measures and if not achieved, presumably to use its equitable powers to
mandate achievement.
The damage award was voided on the grounds that damages coupled
with a permanent injunction were improper. In any event, private nonperma-
nent nuisance damages should have been measured in terms of loss of rental
value. Further, the cooperation rendered by defendant to governmental
authorities made punitive damages improper.
The court's direction on remand gave little guidance with respect to the
character of constraint the court contemplated. The court's voiding of a
permanent injunction which would close down the plant would presumably
limit the trial court to use of a mandatory injunction directing specific steps to
be taken to abate the environmental nuisances with enforcement by contempt
citation for noncompliance.
The issue of availability of damages to the injured plaintiffs was also left
in somewhat less than satisfactory condition. The court reversed because of
the manner in which damages had been computed but left open the possibility
of a damage award premised on the loss of rental value. Judge Fairchild
dissented, viewing the computation for damage to property as based upon a
reasonable inference from the circumstances of causation and not clearly
erroneous even though arrived at by nonexpert testimony. The dissent
accepted the majority's view that damages for personal annoyance under
Indiana law were based on loss of rental value during the time the nuisance
existed for which record support was lacking.
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He further dissented, believing that under Indiana nuisance law87 the
findings of interference with enjoyment of life and property were not clearly
erroneous and served as a sound predicate that defendant was liable for
nuisance. Agreeing with the majority that punitive damages were unwar-
ranted, the dissent felt that compensatory damages for injury to property were
warranted particularly since the injunction was being dissolved.
The dissent found the position of the district court with respect to the
injunction supportable but based on public policy considerations noted by the
majority he would have modified the injunction to permit further operation of
defendant's facility subject to court supervision. Such supervision would
establish a level at which operation could continue without unreasonable
interference with the comfort and enjoyment of plaintiff's property. In the
alternative, he could ascertain at what level the plant could be reasonably
operated upon payment of compensation to plaintiff for the continuing
burden. What the dissent suggested was probably not too far from what the
majority contemplated to be the role of the trial court on remand. However,
the majority's rather sketchy directive in this respect leaves the matter in a
state of uncertainty.
The case underscores the difficulties inherent in resolving complex
environmental problems in the context of nuisance suits. Other courts have
confronted similar problems reaching results bearing some similarity and at
the same time recognizing the unsatisfactory solution of the methods em-
ployed. One partial solution is the structuring of a statewide environmental
control program not limited solely to violation of numerical emission limits
but incorporating the concept of nuisance in the prohibition of air and water
pollution. Definitions of air pollution may preclude unreasonable interference
with the enjoyment of life88 as well as proscribe conduct that not only causes
air pollution but also that which may tend or threaten to cause it. Such a
definition would also prevent emissions for which there are no numerical
limits. Emissions that met such numerical limits but nevertheless caused or
contributed to air pollution could likewise be controlled.
In this manner, controls of the type needed in the instant case could be
invoked as part of the overall state environmental program and enforced by
administrative procedures or judicial action. Such controls would not there-
fore be limited to case-by-case adjudication by harmed residents under
prevailing nuisance concepts. The problems of such reliance are particularly
brought out in the context of the present case where the court refrained from
employing the injunction unless severe health impacts were demonstrated to
result from the challenged conduct notwithstanding the extreme interference
87. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-52-I to 34-1-52-3 (1973) (Burns).
88. See, e.g., id. § 13-1-1-2.
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with the quality of life, a circumstance the court appears to concede.
Considerations of economic reasonableness and technical feasibility would
serve as standards precluding a cease-and-desist order or an injunction in
instances where the disparity between the hardship on the polluter and the
hardship on the community was disproportionate. Although damages could
be awarded only in a civil proceeding, resort to comprehensive state regula-
tion prohibiting unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of life would
achieve comprehensive abatement measures minimizing the need to resort to
damage actions except in extreme circumstances. 89
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. ,90 neighbors filed a suit seeking an
injunction and damages as a consequence of dust, smoke and vibration
emanating from a nearby cement plant. While conceding that the traditional
New York rule would call for the imposition of an injunction where the
nuisance had resulted in substantial injury to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
economic disparity between the consequences of the effect of the injunction
and the effect of the nuisance, the New York court ordered the injunction to be
vacated upon payment of permanent damages to plaintiff as determined by the
trial court. Weighing heavily in the court's determination was the apparent
absence of adequate technology to abate the admitted environmental nuisance
and the apparent lack of assurance that adequate technology would be
forthcoming in the foreseeable future. The court noted that the defendant's
investment in the plant was $45,000,000 and that it employed over 300
people.
89. See, e.g., Illinois Environmental Protection Act, § 3(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, §
1003(b) (1975): "Air Pollution is the presence in the atmosphere of one or more contaminants in
sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and duration as to be injurious to human, plant,
or animal life, to health, or to property, or to unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment of life
or property." Under such a statute, a much broader range of activities is proscribed. See
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, § 9(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1009(a) (1975):
No person shall:
Cause or threaten or allow the discharge or emission of any contaminant into the
environment in any State so as to cause or tend to cause air pollution in Illinois, either
alone or in combination with contaminants from other sources, or so as to violate
regulations or standards adopted by the Board under this Act.
See also § 33(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1033(c) (1975):
In making its orders and determinations, the Board shall take into consideration all
the facts and circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the emissions,
discharges or deposits involved including, but not limited to:
(i) the character and degree of injury to, or interference with the protection of
the health, general welfare and physical property of the people;
(ii) the social and economic value of the pollution source;
(iii) the suitability or unsuitability of the pollution source to the area in which it is
located, including the question of priority of location in the area involved; and
(iv) the technical practicability and economic reasonableness of reducing or
eliminating the emissions, discharges or deposits resulting from such pollution
source.
See Processing & Books v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 Ill. 2d 68, 351 N.E.2d 865 (1976), for a
construction of this section. See also Bloom & Butler, The Illinois Environmental Protection Act:
The Burden of Proof Becomes Clearer, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 57 (1976).
90. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
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In reaching its decision in Boomer, the court relied on Northern Indiana
Public Service Co. v. Vesey. 91 Specifically, the court held that a public
interest would be served by allowing the continued operation of the plant and
denied the injunction. In addition, the court concluded that less injury would
be occasioned by requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff's damages than
by enjoining the operation of the plant. The court observed that such
technological improvements as might ultimately emerge would be the conse-
quence of industry-wide research and resources and not the result of defend-
ant's efforts alone. The dissent felt that an injunction should be granted rather
than depart from the rule. In permitting the injunction to become inoperative
upon payment of permanent damages, the majority was, in effect, licensing a
continuing wrong. Once such permanent damages were assessed and paid,
the incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated thereby allowing a
continuation of air pollution without abatement. The situation was analogized
to reverse condemnation without any benefit to the public, a circumstance
antithetical to the reverse condemnation concept. The dissent would have
enjoined defendant from continuing its harmful discharges unless the de-
fendant could abate its nuisance within eighteen months, anticipating that
within such period more effective procedures would be developed than those
presently employed.
The better remedy is to have the prohibition of unreasonable interference
with enjoyment of life incorporated in the state environmental control act.
This would ensure that all discharges causing this result would be subject to
abatement by action of the state as well as private individuals. If the statute so
provided, this would be accomplished irrespective of compliance with
regulatory limits and without the necessity of demonstrating the presence of
adverse health attributes. The determination of such pollution as so defined
could be played against a standard whereby unreasonableness of the interfer-
ence could be based upon considerations of economic reasonableness,
technological feasibility and such considerations as the degree of interference
with the public health and welfare and the social and economic value of the
pollution source.
The foregoing standards would preserve the elements the Harrison court
believed relevant. It would not impose upon the plaintiffs, however, the
necessity of demonstrating subjective harm. Such statutory inclusions would
not obviate the need for a civil suit for damages, but would lend the force of
the state to the environmental improvement program in the context of
nuisance-oriented pollution. This would be accomplished without necessitat-
ing all impetus coming from the aggrieved neighbors who by virtue of
91. 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620 (1936).
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residing in industrially oriented areas presumably would not possess the
means necessary to employ expert witnesses and legal fees needed to
challenge the industrial polluter.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing opinions of the Seventh Circuit have made a significant
contribution to emerging concepts of environmental law. In some instances
the court plowed new ground by implementation of important federal en-
vironmental statutes. In others, it has shown the inadequacies of traditional
legal procedures in dealing with new and sophisticated environmental con-
cepts. In all instances, it has expedited the resolution of environmental issues.
Deference to administrative determination was accorded, if supported by a
reasoned decision, and where absent, the court, consistent with the Supreme
Court's directive, declined to substitute its judgment for that of the adminis-
trative agency.
American Meat Institute, in particular, implemented federal water
pollution legislation in areas where statutory construction was imperative to
achieve congressionally mandated goals and where the statute itself was
vague and confusing, omitting express procedural directives. Nucleus inter-
preted NEPA in the context of public land use and welfare considerations.
Harrison made manifest the unsuitability of traditional nuisance procedures
to abate pervasive pollution problems. This year's contribution by the court
has furthered the understanding and substance of the environmental area.
